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The Anglo–Japanese Alliance 
The rapid modernization of Japan, in the latter half of the 19th century, greatly upset the 
delicate balance of power in East Asia. After successfully defeating China in 1895, it came 
into direct conflict with the colonizing powers of France, Russia and Germany. Great Brit-
ain wanting to consolidate power in the Far East, decided to enter into an alliance with Ja-
pan officially in 1902. Consequently, this alliance forced Russia to face Japan without the 
help of France in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) which eventually resulted in the 
colossal defeat of the Russian fleet at Tsushima. The Anglo-Japanese alliance was renewed 
in 1911, and a mutual defense pact was incorporated to the agreement.1 
The First World War began on 28 July 1914, and the British ultimatum to Germany ex-
pired at midnight on August 4. At the beginning, Japan’s entrance to the war was not wel-
comed, and by the nature of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, there was no obligation for Japan 
to automatically join in hostilities even if Britain declared war. On 3rd August 1914, British 
Ambassador Sir Conyngham Greene2 visited Minister of Foreign Affairs, Kato Takaaki,3 
and showed him the telegraph which said: 
 
“Sir Edward Grey4 did not think that the Anglo-Japanese Alliance would be in-
volved, nor did he think it likely that His Majesty’s Government would have to ap-
ply to the Imperial Japanese Government under the terms of that Alliance.”5 
 
The British position quickly and often changed in the next few days. Still on 3 August 
Grey said that if hostilities spread to the Far East then the British would rely on Japanese 
support to protect their interest in China. On 4 August Grey told Inoue Katunosue, Japanese 
Ambassador to Great Britain, that Britain should avoid, if it could, to draw Japan into any 
trouble. However, on 7 August, Grey reversed his first proposal and brought a most urgent 
message to Minister Kato, which said, “It is most important that the Japanese fleet should, 
                                                
1 O’Brien, The Anglo-Japanese Alliance, 161-165. 
2 Ambassador to Japan from december 1912. 
3 Foreign minister of Japan at the outbreak of the war, later he will be the 14th Prime Minister of of the 
country. (Japanese names are written according to Japanese custom so family name then given name.) 
4 British Secretary of State, later Ambassador to the United States. 
5 Trotter, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, 1. 
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if possible, hunt out and destroy the armed German erchant cruisers who are now attack-
ing our commerce.”6 
In the beginning Britain tried to limit Japanese involvement both geographically and po-
litically. However, the changing tides of war and the increasing success of the German 
raiders and U-boats forced Britain to ask for more and more help from Japan. This changed 
the strategic area of Japanese assistance from the Far East to the Pacific Ocean, Indian 
Ocean, Atlantic Ocean and eventually to the Mediterranean. 
Extending help 
The first official request to send Japanese ships to the Mediterranean came on 13 Au-
gust. The British Navy asked the Japanese assistant naval attaché, Captain Abo Kiyotane, to 
deploy the cruiser Izumo which had been dispatched to Mexico, to head for Esquimalt7 to 
protect the coast of North America. Then, on 2 September, Grey sounded out Ambassador 
Inoue as to whether the Japanese Government would be disposed to send a division of their 
Navy in order to cooperate with the Allies Navy primarily in the Mediterranean and ulti-
mately in the decisive theatres to cope with the German cruiser Goeben and the light cruiser 
Breslau in the Mediterranean.8 Minister Kato declined the request citing that they cannot 
split the Japanese Navy any further. 
Subsequently, there was no request from Britain for over a year. However, as German 
naval effort had been concentrating on commercial raiders, on 2 February 1916, the British 
Admiralty communicated to its Foreign Office: 
 
“The presence of a flotilla of Japanese destroyers in those waters would be of the 
greatest value in view of the present demand for Allied vessels of this type. Tentative 
enquiry has, from time to time, been made of the Japanese naval attaché as to whether 
his Government would be likely to accede to a request for a flotilla of destroyers to be 
sent to the West, but no indication has been given that the Japanese Government are 
considering the matter. It would not be necessary to specify the Mediterranean as their 
destination, since they could, if preferred, be employed in home waters, thus releasing 
others for the Mediterranean. My Lords quite appreciat  that it may, on political 
grounds, be thought inadvisable to solicit the Japanese government for naval assistance 
in the West, but the practical necessities of the naval situation make it necessary to ask, 
that the suggestion should be seriously considered.” 9 
 
Britain changed the designated target from the Mediterranean to the Indian Ocean, At-
lantic Ocean, Home Waters, North Atlantic and Far Est several times so there was no real 
movement from the Japanese. For a year, Britain stopped all requests coinciding with the 
end of unrestricted submarine warfare. 
                                                
6 Trotter, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, 102-105. 
7 Part of British Columbia. 
8 Trotter, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, 132-133. 
9 Ibid. 153. 
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Changing tides in the Mediterranean 
By the end of 1917, most of the major naval features of World War I had been demon-
strated. This was nowhere more evident than in the North Sea, which had been the principal 
strategic area of the naval war. Here the British and German navies had met in a series of 
inconclusive actions, culminating in the Battle of Jütland in May 1916. The British Grand 
Fleet and the German High Seas Fleet met, but despite erious losses, neither side was able 
to defeat the other decisively. It was this surface stalemate that led to the German decision 
to undertake unrestricted submarine warfare again against Britain in early 1917.10 
After Germany reinstated the unrestricted submarine warfare, Britain asked Japan to 
help escort convoys in the Mediterranean to help the war effort. The Japanese opinion about 
giving assistance changed, because while in the beginnin  of the war it was in their interest 
to limit their involvement, later as all major powers engaged each other in naval combat the 
Japanese missing out on the combat experience concerned the Admiralty. 
The Japanese Navy was in great need to gain practical knowledge in modern warfare 
and naval combat. On 4 February 1917 another request was sent to Japan. This time, how-
ever, seeing that the Japanese were much more receptiv  to help, the British government 
asked for a whole fleet. Japan was firmly against the possibility of sending capital ships to 
the Mediterranean, because despite their power they were neither helpful against subma-
rines nor suitable for escort missions. 
The Imperial Navy decided to dispatch destroyer squadrons to the Mediterranean and 
presented the following conditions to Ambassador Greene from Minister Motono11 on 2 
February: 
 
1. The Tsushima and the Niitaka to be sent to the Cape of Good Hope.12 
2. The Akashi and a detachment of destroyers, consisting of two flotillas to be sent to 
the Mediterranean.13 
3. Those vessels not to be placed under the command of the Admiral Commander-in-
Chief of the British Naval Forces, but to act in co-operation with him or at his re-
quest. 
4. It is to be understood that any reinforcement of the Japanese ships now to be sent 
will be impossible under actual conditions of the Japanese Navy, and that the ships 
are to be based on Malta will not be called upon to extend their operations beyond 
the Mediterranean.14 
 
Japan formed and sent the 2nd Special Squadron of the Imperial Japanese Navy under 
the command of Rear Admiral Sato Kozo to help convoys defend against submarines. The 
                                                
10 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 167. 
11 Motono Ichirō foreign minister of Japan from 16th of November 1916. 
12 Both ships were cruisers. 
13 All together 1 cruiser and 8 destroyers (Akashi, Ume, Kusunoki, Kaede, Katsura, Kashiwa, Matsu, 
Sugi, and Sakaki) 
14 Trotter, British Documents on Foreign Affairs, 176. 
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fleet initially consisted of the cruiser Akashi and the eight destroyers of the 10th and 11th 
Destroyer Flotillas. Later, in the beginning of 1918 the squadron was reinforced with the 
cruisers Izumo and Nisshin and the 15th Destroyer Flotilla.15 Altogether, the 2nd Special 
Squadron was comprised of 3 cruisers and 12 destroyers. 
By the end of the war, ships belonging to the squadron had accompanied 788 Allied 
ships, including transports carrying 70,000 troops. They engaged German and Austro–
Hungarian submarines on 34 occasions failing however to sink any of them.16 Successfully 
completed 348 escort missions covering over 240,000 nautical miles.17 
Overall Japan lost 72 sailors in the 16 months theyw re stationed in Malta. The biggest 
loss they suffered was from the loss of the destroyer Sakaki which after being torpedoed lost 
59 officers. The ship however still made it back to port successfully.18 British leaders lavishly 
praised the Japanese for their performance in the Mediterranean. Winston Churchill, who as 
First Lord of the Admiralty, was the driving force b hind British and Japanese naval coopera-
tion. He “did not think the Japanese [Squadron] had ever done a foolish thing”. 
The governor of Malta, Lord Methuen, while reviewing Japanese warships in March 
1919, lauded the Japanese navy for “its splendid work in European waters” and expressed 
the hope, that “God grants our alliance, cemented in blood, may long endure”. The Japa-
nese Navy spent 72% of their time at sea compared with 60% by the British and about 45% 
by the French and Italian Navy.19 
Effects of the 2nd Special Squadron 
The Allies felt that Japan was always asking too much compensation for what they re-
garded as marked contrast to her small assistance, d that the Japanese sea power pro-
jected to the Mediterranean was commented as being “o ly a drop in the bucket” by the 
British Navy. However, the Second Special Squadron accomplished great success in diplo-
matically supporting the national interest of Japan. During and after the war, these destroy-
ers visited 53 ports around France, Britain, Italy, Belgium and Greece. In London, they par-
ticipated in the victory parade and could show thatJapan had cooperated with Britain. In 
Paris, Japanese sailors showed their existence not only to the citizens of Paris, but also to 
the delegates of the Peace Conference. One of the member to the Paris conference, Ambas-
sador to Italy Hayashi Gonnosuke told Admiral Sato that by the Japanese activities in the 
Mediterranean, Japan was able to show her loyalty as an Ally and obtain understanding of 
the Japanese contribution to this war. Hayashi said, “We could show that Japan supported 
the Allies as an ‘entente’ and thus obtained the position as one of five big powers at the 
Paris Peace Conference.”20 
Another interesting long-term effect of the reluctance of Japan to send ships and espe-
cially capital ships to Europe was that both Britain nd the United States thought that Japan 
was keeping most of its navy safe so the ships will be ready for the next war. This led to a 
                                                
15 The 4 destroyers of the 15th Flotilla are Momo, Kashi, Hinoki, Yanagi. 
16 Evans and Peattie, Kaigun, 169. 
17 1 nautical mile is 1852 meters, 240,000 nautical miles is 444,480 kms, enough to circle the Earth 11 times. 
18 Halpern, A Naval History of World War I, 393. 
19 Falls, The Great War 1914-1918, 295. 
20 Sato, Oshu Taisenchu Chichukai niokuru Teikoku Kaigun no Sakusen, 20-21. 
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deep distrust especially from the United States that directly influenced the U.S. policy to-
wards Japan in general, but more importantly in the upcoming Washington Naval Confer-
ence, where the capital ship quota of Japan was limited. 
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Bateaux japonais dans la Méditerranée. Un allié improbable escorte 700 000 soldats 
pour l’Entente 
La modernisation rapide du Japon dans la deuxième moitié du 19e siècle a grandement 
bouleversé la balance du pouvoir délicate en Asie de l’Est. Après avoir vaincu la Chine en 
1895, le Japon est entré en conflit avec les forces colonisateurs de la France, de la Russie et 
de l’Allemagne. La Grande-Bretagne, voulant consolider son pouvoir en Extrême-Orient, a 
décidé de faire alliance officiellement avec le Japon en 1902. Cette alliance a forcé la 
Russie de faire face au Japon sans l’aide de la France qui a causé un défait colossal de la 
flotte russe à Tsushima. L’alliance a été renforcée en 1911 pour inclure un pacte de défense 
mutuelle. Ainsi, au moment où la Première Guerre mondiale a éclaté, le Japon a joint le 
camp de l’Entente. 
Quand l’Allemagne a rétabli la guerre sous-marine à outrance au début de 1917, 
l’Angleterre a demandé au Japon d’aider à escorter des convois dans la Méditerranée pour 
aider l’effort de la guerre. Le Japon a envoyé le deuxième escadron spécial (2nd Special 
Squadron) de la Marine Impériale Japonaise pour défen re contre les sous-marins. La flotte se 
consistait officiellement du croiseur Akashi et de huit destroyers du 10e et du 11e flottille de 
destroyer. Jusqu’à la fin de la guerre, des bateaux appartenant à l’escadron ont accompagné 
788 bateaux des Alliées, des transporteurs emportant 700 000 soldats compris. Ils ont attaqué 
38 fois des sous-marins allemands et austro-hongrois, sans réussir à couler quelconque. 
Tout compte fait, le Japon a perdu 72 marins pendant les 16 mois où ils étaient stati-
onnés à Malte. Les Japonais ont été somptueusement glorifiés pour leur performance dans 
la Méditerranée par les leaders britanniques. Winston Churchill, qui était Premier seigneur 
de l’Amirauté à l’éclatement de la guerre, était la force motrice de la coopération maritime 
britannique et japonaise. Il « n’a jamais pensé que les [escadrons] Japonais auraient fait une 
chose absurde ». 
Le gouverneur de la Malte, Lord Methuen, en étudiant les navires de guerre japonais en 
mars 1919, a glorifié la marine japonaise pour son « travail splendide dans les eaux euro-
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péennes » et il a exprimé son espoir en disant les suivants : « Dieu accorde notre alliance, 
cimentée par le sang, qu’elle dure longtemps. » 
